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ARTICLES 
The Federation of Labour's right to 
bargain campaign: its background, impact 
and effectiveness 
Raymond Harbridge and Don Edwards* 
In a period 'vhere trade union organisation \Vas persistently attacked by the Govern-
nzent and denied the right to industrial bargaining, union leaders of the 1980s have conz-
nzitted tlzenzselves to a lVidespread understanding of industrial and wider econonzic issues 
facing working people. Organisationally the Federation of Labour ( FoL) set out to achieve 
this through the development of the ''canzpaign" strategy. The ca1npaigns included rneet-
ings, rallies, and short industrial stoppages. The first of the carnpaigns took place in 1980 
and the 1nost recent in 1984. This research exan1ines the 1984 FoL canzpaign - the right 
to bargain campaign - and reveals that it was one of JVew Zealand's largest ever single 
industrial disputes, ·with over 57 000 workers losing over 125 000 working days in less than 
3 rnonths. The extent of the ca1npaign reflects the increased ability of the FoL to co-
ordinate and direct a campaign in selected areas. The campaign came to an abrupt end 
when Prime Minister, Sir Robert Muldoon, called an unscheduled General Election. This 
led the FoL to direct its efforts away fronz industrial stoppages and towards the election 
of a Labour Governnzent. Labour won the 1984 election, winning particularly vvell in the 
nzajor city centres. The authors hypothesise that the educative ilnpact of the right to 
bargain canzpaign was in part responsible far that electoral victory and to that extent 
the carnpaign could be considered a success. 
Introduction 
The last 5 years of Sir Robert Muldoon's National Government, the period from 1979 
to 1984, provided the trade union movement in New Zealand with one of its most testing 
periods ever. A succession of Government interventions in industrial relations, aimed at 
restricting trade union rights, were epitomised by 2 major policy enactrnents. In June 
1982, the Prime Minister announced a wage and price freeze by regulations passed under 
the Economic Stabilisation Act (1948). The effect of this was to totally freeze all indus-
trial negotiations over industrial matters unless approval was first given by Cabinet. This 
freeze lasted throughout 1983 and \vage bargaining did not take place again until December 
1984. 
The second change to New Zealand's industrial relations system during this period was 
the introduction of the Industrial Law Refonn Bill 1983. This had the effect of abolishing 
and completely prohibiting the post-entry closed shop system of union n1embership that 
New Zealand had operated under since the mid 1930s.1 
The secretary of the Federation of Labour (FoL) claimed that the introduction of 
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the legislation to itnplernent the abolition of the closed shop followed "a whole series of 
initiatives and actions taken by this (National) Government against the trade union n1ove-
ment or sections of the trade union movement." He cited 21 examples of legislative 
moves against the trade union movement and concluded "I say New Zealand unionism 
is under its greatest challenge for decades'' (Douglas, 1983, p33). 
This challenge led trade unionists to mount a series of campaigns as a response "to 
the persistence of high unen1ployment levels, the enforced reduction in real wages of 
workers and the legislative attacks" (Douglas, 1984, p. 115). 
The development of the campaign strategy needs to be seen in the context of 2 sig-
nificant new directions within the union movement. The first new direction was the closer 
liasion and co-ordination of activity between public and private sector unionists and the 
move to decentralise public sector union activity. The second new direction was the 
development of the grass-roots orientated "campaign" approach to the development of 
union organisation and support for union policies. This approach differed from that of the 
'·Rob here, Tom'' personal and top-level approach that Prime Minister, Sir Robert 
Muldoon. had had with the FoL's Sir Tom Skinner _2 
Sir Tom Skinner retired from the Presidency of the FoL in 1979 and a new style of 
trade union leadership has emerged in New Zealand since then. That new style is com-
mitted to developing a widespread understanding of not just industrial issues but the wider 
social and econornic decisions facing working people in New Zealand. The focus of this 
new approach has been the development by the FoL of an alternative economic strategy 
designed to pron1ote debate about the social and economic decisions taken by Govern-
ment. A former FoL economist has outlined this policy: 
Unions have increasingly realised that workers' living standards are determined not only 
by wages and conditions but also by the taxes that they pay, the benefits the}' receive 
from the Government expenditure, the inflation rates they face, their prospects of getting 
a job, and the overall direction (or lack of it) of economic development. Even if one 
limits the role oft he unions to being only concerned about the living standards of union 
members, it would still be necessary for the union movement to develop a position on 
such issues (Kirk, 1983, p. 218). 
Not only was the policy different, so was the method of obtaining support for that 
policy, achieved predominantly through the development of the union 44Campaign" among 
rank and file men1bers and the general public. 
Previous campaigns 
The first of the can1paigns, the defence of living standards campaign, began in 1980. 
It \Vas aimed to publicise the impact of Government expenditure cuts on working people, 
and the necessity for a wage increase to compensate for cost of living increases. The 
campaign centred around a Hfortnight of action" launched in Auckland on 29 May 1980 
at a meeting attended by more than 1 000 union officials and delegates (Scott, 1980). 
This campaign saw a marked increase in co-operation between private and public 
sector unionists and this closer liasion was noted in the FoL's annual report to the 1981 
conference: 
It needs to be recognised that the defence of living ~1andards campaign could have only 
reached the me-Jstue of success that it did by the enthusiastic goodwill and co-operation 
of the affiliates and members of the Combined State Unions (CSU) (NZFoL, 1981, p. 8). 
The 1982 annual conference of the FoL resolved to continue the Hcampaign" 
2 "Rob here, Tom" is the title of a chapter in Sir Tom Skinner's autobiography in which Skinner 
outlines his relationship with Muldoon. See Skinner and Berry (1980). 
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approach and decided to launch a 5-point campaign to publicise the harmful effects of a 
wage-tax trade off, to voice opposition to Government wage controls, and to stress the 
need for a minimum living wage, the right to a cost of living adjustment and the d,esirability 
of tax reforms (Roth, 1982a). In addition a significant development in union organisation 
was reported with the establishment of regional comnuttees by the CSU as a follow on 
from the defence of living standards carnpaign (NZFoL, 1982). 
The co-operation between the FoLand the CSU continued in this series of campaigns 
with the promotion in 1982 of a joint newspaper Campaign against the cuts in living 
standards and a FoL/CSU meeting on 1 September 1982 which approved a plan for protest 
action against the wage freeze. Stop work rallies, open to all members of the public, 
were to be held around New Zealand to demand an immediate wage increase, an adequate 
living wage and more jobs. These culminated in a special conference held in November 
1982 (Roth, 1982b ). 
The 36 stop-\vork rallies that resulted were attended by over 90 000 people, the 
smallest rally being at Taihape where 90 attended and the larg,est at Auckland where 
a massive lunch march up Queen Street was attended by a crowd estimated to be as large as 
60 000 (Roth, 1983a). 
The rallies were seen by the FoL as: 
Extremely successful in agitating a wider public opinion and concern over the economic 
issues confronting the population of New Zealand. The rallies made a very solid founda-
tion for the special conference of the Fa L held on 18 November. The experience in all 
areas, of distributing the campaign newspapers, mobilising local support and co-ordinat-
ing activities on a national basis, was the most successful ever carried out by the FoL 
and the CSU (NZFoL, 1983, p. 27). 
The F oL special conference on 18 November 1982 called for the Government and 
employers to award a $20 a week wage increase as an interim compensation for cost of 
living increases occuring during the period of the wage freeze imposed on 22 June 1982. 
The 1983 FoL conference reaffirmed the de1nand for the $20 a week interim increase and 
following the conference the campaign for the $20 a week pay increase gathered n1omen-
tum, particularly in Auckland. There on 3 1 une 1983 the Combined Union Information 
Service claimed that there was stop-work action taking place in more than 200 jobs. 
A spokesperson stated: 
We've had more people involved in industrial activity in the past 2 weeks than in the one 
day stoppage in 1979. It is probably the greatest industrial activity in New Zealand's 
history. Ninety-two industries, companies and jobs in Auckland have voted to take some 
form of industrial action such as brief stoppages, overtime and export bans and work to 
rules (Quoted in Roth, 1983b). 
The campaigns so far had not achieved an across the board interim wage increase for 
all workers, nor had they achieved a return to bargaining rights for all unions. In recogni-
tion of this, in early July 1983, the Auckland Trades Council decided to highlight the right 
of unions to negotiate awards rather than the $20 campaign. The CSU were late entering 
the campaign. In mid October they intensified the campaign against the wage freeze which 
the CSU had renamed the "great State pay robbery'' when some 30 000 state servants 
in Auckland took part in various protest activities including a 1-hour stoppage at Govern-
ment offices (Roth, 1983c). 
Despite the lack of success in gaining the "$20", the FoL reviewed the campaign by 
stating: 
The experience of this campaign indicated a significant increase in involvement of unions 
and workers in all regions of the country. The experience gained by the trad,e union 
movement during these campaigns will prove to be a decisive factor in the continuation 
of mobilisation of workers around the demands of the trade union movement as a con-
sequence of the Industrial Law Reform Bill (NZFoL, 1984a). 
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The right to bargain campaign: objectives 
The right to bargain campaign was undertaken in the context of the persistent attacks 
by the Government on union organisation. The national council of the FoL resolved that 
the campaign was directed at: 
... consolidating the activity of the trade union movement around the issues of trade 
union rights, wage levels, jobs and the election of a Labour Government. That the 
national council calls upon all district councils and affiliates to convene rank and file 
membership meetings, meetings of delegates and union representatives to hear reports 
directly from the representatives of the national executive for the purpose of: 
- mobilising support around the policy of the CSU and Federation of Labour statement 
- developing combined union action to implement this policy 
- developing local activity in conjunction with other groups, particularly the unem-
ployed and beneficiaries in mobilising support for opposition to the policies of this 
Government (NZFoL, 1984b). 
The posit ion adopted by the national council at its February meeting was confirmed 
by the national executive at a special meeting on 23 March 1984. That meeting was called 
to examine a statement by the Prime Minister that there would be a general wage increase 
of $8 only from I April 1984 and an indefinite extension of the wage freeze. The national 
executive resolved l hat: 
This situation cannot be accepted. Accordingly, unions will be supported by the Federa-
tion of Labour in action taken to protect their members by achieving direct negotiations 
with their employers (NZFoL, 1984c). 
Within a week the Prime Minister's statement about the general wage increase, the 
JVeH' Zealand Herald reported that "Industrial turbulence continued in parts of New 
Zealand yesterday as union protest grew against the $8-a-week general wage order"3 The 
report identified "turbulence'' at a car assembly plant, a meat processing works, a fish 
processing factory, and a pulp and paper plant. In the 3 months that followed, a wide 
range of industries and employers became the target for industrial action. Two industries, 
however. the meat pro~essing industry and the waterfront industry, were particularly 
prominent on a national basis. 
In April 1984, the New Zealand Meatworker's Union approached the New Zealand 
Freezing Companies Association and asked them to tnake a joint approach to the ~Govern­
ment to allow conciliation talks for a new national award to take into account changing 
conditions in the indus try. The Freezing Companies Association refused to make such a 
joint approach to the Government with the result that the national executive of the New 
Zealand Meatworker's Union decided to start a rolling campaign, in line with the policy 
decision of the FoL's national council and designed to encourage freezing companies 
to change their stance. The rolling campaign commenced on 30 April 1984. The secretary 
of the New Zealand Meatworkers' Union outlined the form of the action as "The lucky 
marble to determine where the first rolling stoppage will occur will be drawn out of a hat 
at daybreak. There will be a phone call to the branch secretary concerned. He will com· 
municate with the sub-branches, and the men will be told it's a homer"4 In the 4 weeks 
that followed, all freezing works in New Zealand drew 4 'the lucky n1arble'' twice, son1e 
drew it 3 times. The New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union joined the meatworkers 
in their campaign of rolling stoppages against the wage freeze and in support of FoL 
policy, on 7 May 1984, the eve of the FoL's annual conference. Watersiders in all but 
3 Nev.• Zealand Herald 30 March 1984, pl, Auckland. 
4 The Press 30 April 1984, pl, Christchurch 
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2 of the 12 ports around New Zealand struck for a 24-hour period. As will be shown 
later, the combined actions of the New Zealand Meatworkers' Union and the New Zealand 
Waterside Workers' Union contributed SO percent of the workers involved in the campaign, 
and were clearly a significant force in shaping the campaign. They were by no means, 
however, the only groups of workers involved in the campaign. The campaign of industrial 
action met with an abrupt and unscheduled end, when, on Thursday 14 June 1984, Sir 
Robert Muldoon announced that resulting from his inability to control his own caucus 
there would be a "snap" general election on 14 July 1984. The FoLand affiliated unions 
directed their attention away from industrial action, and towards that aspect of the right 
to bargain campaign designed to elect a Labour Government. 
The actions of the meatworkers, watersiders, and other workers in the response to the 
FoL's call for action, are the subject of this research in an attempt to examine the impact 
of the right to bargain campaign on union effectiveness in New Zealand. 
Measuring the right to bargain campaign 
The FoL policy of having affiliated unions and district councils convene rank and flle 
meetings for the purpose of hearing reports and of mobilising support and union action, 
was a key determinant in the success or otherwise of the campaign. Support for the 
campaign took several forms, generally focusing on the issues of bargaining rights over 
wage levels. Trade unionists made specific wage claims on their employers and, when that 
claim was rejected, took limited industrial action- generally in the form of a strike. Other 
forms of support included moral and financial assistance for workers involved in any 
extended stoppage - the moral support coming through the passing of resolutions of 
support at stop-work meetings and the financial support coming through donations of 
money and food. In attempting to evaluate the nature and extent of the campaign it was 
simply not possible to measure the number of rank and ftle meetings held, the number of 
supportive resolutions passed, nor the level of fmancial contributions made from unionists. 
In the case of some unions, the support offered to the campaign at this level was sig-
nificant. For example, the Auckland branch of New Zealand's largest private sector union, 
the New Zealand Engineers Union, was 1 union not only heavily involved in the stoppages 
aspect of the campaign, but also in other aspects. The union branch aimed to avoid causing 
major inconvenience to the public and to engender rank and ftle support in shops with 30 
or more financial members, requesting financial and moral support for all those taking 
action. Fifty seven percent (13 207 members) of the branch work in shops with 30 or 
more union members. On April 3, 1984, 133 engineers union members at the Auckland 
factory of Union Carbide, took indefinite stoppage action. In the weeks that followed the 
Union Carbide walkout, over 80 percent {1 0 743 members) of these larger workplaces 
were involved in campaign meetings, at 96 different job sites. In addition the union 
estimates a further 80 meetings were held in shops with fewer than 30 members. Union 
sources report that the majority of these meetings were site meetings of all unions, not 
only engineers. The union declined to reveal the level of financial support raised for the 
strikers but it is believed to be substantial.5 
Likewise there is no direct way of measuring the extent to which employers conceded 
to union claims during this period. It would be reasonable to conclude that many 
employers agreed to union claims, ignored the Wage Freeze Regulations 1982, and didn't 
notify their assent to union claims to either the Arbitration Court or the news-media. 
This contention is supported by evidence that during the 1981-1982 wage round, for 
example, approximately two thirds of voluntary settlements negotiated by I major union 
were not registered with (or notified to) the Arbitration Court as was then required by the 
5. The unions branch organisers were required to keep detans of job sites visited, numbers attending, 
re~lutions passed, money raised etc. This information was made avaDable to the authors, on an 
aggregate basis, by the union. 
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Wage Adjustment Regulations 1974 (Harbridge, 1983a). 
In measuring the campaign. it is necessary to identify easily acceSSible and tanpble 
features of the campaign and for this reason, this research concentrates on industrial 
stoppages - where production time was lost - be they extended stopwork meetings, 
one-day stoppages, protracted strikes, or load-out bans. Evidence of this industrial cam-
paign was initially sought by examining newspaper reports of the campaign. Harbridge 
( 1984b) has shown that disputes feature prominently in industrial reporting and that 
local industrial disputes and issues are frequently reported in the local papers. Con-
sequently, 10 of New Zealand's 30 daily newspapers were examined for the period from 
23 March 1984 to 30 June 1984. The papers examined were the Northern Advocate in 
Whangarei, the New Zealllnd Herald in Auckland, the Waikllto Times in Hamilton, the 
Hawkes Bay Herald in Napier, the Manawatu Evening Standtll'd in Palmerston North, The 
Dominion, and The Evening Post in Wellington, the Press in Christchurch; the Otago DaUy 
Times in Dunedin, and the Southlllnd Times in lnvercargill. 
The information provided in the newspaper items was checked with the employer and 
union cited. Industrial relations and personnel officers, along with trade unionists, were 
helpful and forthright in providing the data sought. In addition many employers and 
unions contacte.d were able to identify other disputes that had not received newspaper 
coverage. Other disputes were identified by direct contact with officials of the FoL and 
the New Zealand Employers Federation. These additional disputes were checked and are 
included in these results. 
The information sought about the industrial action included the total number of 
workers employed by the employer; whether the dispute involved more than one union; 
type of industrial action taken; length of that action and whether there was any follow-up 
action taken; number of workers involved in the action directly (through strike action) 
and indirectly (through employer initiated suspensions of workers under Part IX of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973); the number of working days lost directly or indirectly; 
the industrial district; and the employers industrial sector. 
Each dispute observed has been recorded as a separate dispute. For example, each 
meat processing works that lost production as a result of a strike by members of the New 
Zealand Meatworkers' Union was recorded separately although this series of rolling stop-
pages was the result of 1 dispute between the union and the New Zealand Freezing Com-
panies Association. Where a second strike or other action followed, that action was not 
recorded as a new dispute but as a continuation of the first dispute. 
The extent of the right to bargain campaign 
The campaign of industrial action lasted 87 days. The first dispute began on 26 March 
1984 and the final dispute ended on 20 June 1984 - less than 1 week after the announce-
ment of the snap general election. In that period 1 52 work stoppages were identified. 
Of these 56 involved the New Zealand Meatworkers' Union, 12 involved the New Zealand 
Waterside Workers' Union, and the remaining 84 were spread over a wide range of 
industries. 
Throughout New Zealand, a total of 57 264 workers took direct action supporting the 
campaign. Forty five percent of these (25 893) were members of the New Zealand Meat-
workers' Union and a further 5 percent (2 771) were from the New Zealand Waterside 
Workers' Union. A total of 126 793 working days were lost, 48 percent (61 413) by meat-
workers and a further 2 percent (2 771) by watersiders. The total number of workers 
involved and the total number of working days lost represent approximately one third of 
working days lost in all industrial stoppages in New Zealand in any of the last 6 years. 
These comparative figures are presented in Table I. In addition they show that the average 
duration of each stoppage was less than 3 days and that the average number of days lost 
per worker involved was 2.21 days. 
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Table 1: Right to bargain canzpaign : lVOrkers involved and "'orking days lost compared 
"'ith all stoppages 1978-83 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Average 
1978-83 
Right to 
Bargaining 
INDUSTRIAL STOPPAGES 
Manufacturing 
Total Sector 
Number % 
441 264 64.2 
523 324 61.9 
360 241 66.9 
291 202 69.4 
333 219 65.7 
333 135 39.9 
375 230 61.3 
152 114 75.0 
• Average of averages 
\Vorkers 
Involved 
157 903 
158 195 
127 651 
135 006 
155 969 
140 730 
145 909 
57 264 
Working Average Days Average 
Days Lost Lost per Duration 
Worker Involved 
380 605 2.41 3.28 
381 896 2.41 3.52 
373 496 2 .93 3.65 
388 086 2.87 4.46 
330 028 2.16 4.45 
371 774 2.64 4.53 
370 980 2.54 3.98* 
126 793 2.21 2.91 
Table 2 presents the figures for workers involved in the campaign and working days 
lost by industrial district. Forty seven percent (27 037) of the workers involved were in 
the Northern industrial district (Nid) losing 43 percent (54 972) of the working days lost. 
This pattern is consistent with normal patterns of industrial stoppages in New Zealand. 
The heavily populated manufacturing oriented Nid accounted for 46 percent of working 
days lost in all stoppages over the period frotn 197 8 to 1982.6 Support for the carnpaign 
predon1ina ted in the Nid. When the industrial action of \Vorkers other than meatworkers 
and watersiders is considered , the importance of workers domiciled in the Nid is recog-
nised . They represented 72 percent (20 657) of the ' ·other" workers involved and lost 
68 percent ( 42 818) working days in the campaign. Clearly the impact of the workers 
in the Nid was critical to the campaign's potential success , and far outstripped ordinary 
stoppage rates in the Nid. 
Table 2: Right to bargain campaign : \VOrkers inl'Olved and vJorking days lost by industrial 
district 
Freezing Workers 
Workers Watersiders 
bn,olved Others 
Total 
% 
Working Freezing Workers 
Days 
Lost 
Watersiders 
Others 
Total 
% 
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT 
North. Taranaki Wgtn Nelson Cant. Otago South. Total % 
5 476 
904 
20 657 
27 037 
47 
11 250 
904 
42 818 
1 921 
1 740 
3 661 
6 
3 770 
7 285 
6 773 
717 
2 098 
9 588 
17 
16 191 
717 
7 609 
465 
108 
900 
1 473 
3 
903 
108 
2 150 
4 160 
630 
1402 
6192 
11 
8 306 
630 
1 838 
1 618 
172 
1 803 
3 593 
6 
5 480 
240 
5 720 
10 
4 849 16 144 
172 240 
909 
25 893 45 
2 771 5 
28 600 50 
57 264 100 
100 
61413 48 
2 771 2 
62 609 50 
54 972 11 055 24 517 3 161 10 774 5 930 16 384 126 793 100 
43 9 19 3 8 5 13 100 
6. Source: Department of Statistics 
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The right to bargain campaign was concentrated in the manufacturing sector with 66 
percent (37 805) of the workers involved and 78 percent {99 400) of the working days 
lost. Table 3 reports workers involved and working days lost by industrial sector. The 
very clear impact of the campaign was in those sectors where public inconvenience was 
minimal. 
Table 3 : Right to bargain campaign : workers involved and working days lost by industrial 
sector 
INDUSTRIAL SECfOR 
Mass stopworks and/or strikes by workers in 
multi-industry group 
Agriculture and Grazing 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Road and Rail Transport 
Air Transport 
Shipping and Stevedoring 
Finance Insurance Real Estate 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Government and Local Authority 
Recreational Services 
Social Community Services 
Other Personal and Community Services 
TOTAL 
Workers 
Involved 
3 000 
670 
37 80S 
1 soo 
9 440 
2 771 
98 
1 980 
51264 
% 
s 
1 
66 
3 
17 
s 
3 
100 
Working 
Days Lost 
1 soo 
6 300 
99 400 
6 875 
6 360 
2 771 
1 016 
2 571 
126 793 
% 
1 
s 
78 
5 
5 
3 
1 
2 
100 
Only 24 of the disputes (15 percent) were multi-union disputes involving more than 1 
union. The most common form of industrial action taken was strike action, being reported 
in 127 cases (83 percent). Extended large stopwork meetings were recorded in 15 cases 
(10 percent). Other forms of action included the imposing of loadout and overtime bans. 
Most industrial action was a oneoff action with followup industrial action being recorded 
in 54 cases (34 percent). The followup action was invariably strike action and in 21 cases 
(14 percent) 3 or more separate stoppages followed the original stoppage. 
The industrial action was most likely to occur at workplaces of large companies. 
Fifty seven percent of disputes occured at companies employing more than 1 000 workers 
and only I 0 percent occured at companies employing less than 50 workers. Stoppages, 
then, occured at unusually large workplaces by New Zealand standards. New Zealand 
employers are not required to make any official returns of their total number of 
employees. However, in the manufacturing sector - the sector in which over 75 percent 
of the right to bargain disputes occured - 51 percent of establishments (as opposed to 
companies) employ less than 10 workers, and only 0.02 percent of establishments employ 
more than I 000 workers 7 Notwithstanding this trend for workers in large rather than 
small companies to stopwork over the campaign, the stoppages have been limited to com-
paratively small areas within individual companies and the total workforce of a company 
has been rarely involved in a stoppage. Seventy one disputes ( 47 percent) involved 100 
or less workers and only I3 disputes (1 0 percent) involved more than 1 000 workers 
at the same time. 
Employers were clearly reluctant to invoke the suspension of non-striking worker 
provisions available to them under part IX of the lnd us trial Relations Act 1973. Only 9 
instances of employer initiated suspensions were recorded. There were 1 698 workers 
suspended, who lost 7 906 working days as a result. No doubt this employer reluctance 
was in part due to the fact that each industrial stoppages was of a short duration. 
7. New Zealand Official Yearbook 1983, Wellington, Government Printer, p. 503. 
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Discussion 
Notwithstanding the 1951 waterfront lockout, the right to bargain campaign was New 
Zealand's largest ever industrial dispute in terms of the numbers of workers who took part 
in industrial action and the number of working days lost as a result. The size of the cam-
paign was a reflection of the increased ability of the 1980s leadership of the FoL to co-
ordinate an industrial campaign. This co-ordinating ability was demonstrated at various 
levels. For example, conscious of the impact of unfavourable public opinion on the 
overall success of the can1paign, the FoL decid,ed that the campaign should result in as 
little inconvenience to the general public as possible. The results presented above clearly 
indicate that this tactic was successful, with the only incident of public inconvenience 
observed by the authors being a half day stoppage of bus drivers in a northern city. Other 
stoppages were predominately in the manufacturing sector and were of a short (yet sharp) 
nature resulting in little if any, public inconvenience. 
The rank and file membership of the CSU played no part in the campaign of stop-
pages. This \Vas because the snap election intervened. The CSU executive had planned 
a series of stopworks and rallies from early July, but these were abandoned. That the CSU 
was late to enter the industrial fray on the right to bargaining campaign, in no way detracts 
from our finding that this series of campaigns has led to the closer co-ordination of 
activities between public and private sector union organisations. An added benefit for the 
CSU of the campaigns was the development of a regional structure. The development of 
this joint FoL/CSU approach to campaign organisation has foreshadowed the proposal 
within the New Zealand trade union movement to have just 1 central organisation of 
workers, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions. This proposal is designed to replace 
the present (increasingly artificial) distinction between private and public sector union 
organisations. 
One of the more important outcomes from the development of the campaigns and 
their success, has been the ability of the trade union movement to start to change the 
nature of the industrial relations agenda in the eyes of the Government. This change 
replaces a narrow approach to "industrial relations" where only direct employer- worker 
matters are considered relevant to an agenda, to one in which the trade union n1ovement 
is recognised as having a role in a tripartite setting, exan1ining the nature and direction of 
New Zealand society and its economy. This changing of the agenda has been achieved 
through altering the expectations within the union movement. The educational impact 
of the campaigns has led to significant rank and file discussion and debate of issues related 
to the economy and its effect on working people. The rallies and meetings have had a 
considerable impact within the union movement in raising the consciousness of those 
attending, and altering the level of debate about those issues that are validly the concern 
of the trade union movement. 
The organisational impact of the campaign in preserving the trade union movement 
in the face of voluntary unionism has been of concern to the FoL. At this stage it is too 
early to comment on the full impact of voluntary unionism on New Zealand unions, but 
the preliminary findings of Harbridge and Walsh ( 1985) indicated that with the exceptions 
of 2 union groups, membership losses were of the range of 1 to 5 percent. This finding, 
that the post-entry closed shop would be retained by the vast majority of those already 
belonging to unions) may be further evidence of the effectiveness of the campaigns. Those 
unions that played an important role in the right to bargain campaign \vere largely immune 
from the impact of voluntary unionism. 
One of the objectives of the right to bargain campaign was the election of a Labour 
Government in the scheduled November 1984 election. While the calling of the snap 
election altered the timing of the election by 4 months, it intensified union efforts to 
ensure a Labour victory. When the snap election was announced the attention of the 
union movement was directed from industrial action to electoral support for Labour. 
The form of the activity changed but the aim of the activity was consistent. Labour won 
the election with a handsome (if not landslide) victory. 
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While it is acknowledged that there are many factors involved in every general election 
victory (and defeat), it is argued that the right to bargain campaign with its organisational 
and educational impact, was a very important factor in Labour's win. It is worth noting 
that following the July 1984 election, the National Party held only 6 seats from the main 
city centres in Parliament, and that as a political party National must now be seen as having 
representatives from only its rural rump. In the cities, where most of the rallies had taken 
place, Labour gained many National seats. In Wellington, for example, the National Party 
now holds no seats at all, and seats that 6 years ago were marginal National/Labour can 
now be considered safe Labour seats. 
The Dominion, in reviewing the events of 1984, headlined one article 64Strikes, more 
strikes and victory for Lange". The strikes referred to in the headline include stoppages 
over voluntary unionism and site disputes at the Marsden Point refinery expansion site. 
The right to bargain campaign is dismissed as: 
The freezing workers began random stoppages - later joined by waterfe workers - in 
what turns out to be a futile bid to force a return to free wage bargaining. 
Of real interest here, however, is that the general tenor of The Dominion article was 
that the strikes and the election of Lange's Labour Government were discrete, independent 
events. In fact, the weight of evidence is that the right to bargain and its predecessor 
campaigns led indirectly (if not directly) to Lange's election. 
That The Dominion failed to examine the link between the strikes, the campaigns and 
Labour's election success, is hardly surprising. The approach of the newspapers throughout 
the right to bargain campaign was to faithfully report disputes and incidents as they 
occurred, but to fail to analyse the overall significance and impact of the campaign. The 
authors saw no newspaper attempt an analysis of even the size of the campaign let alone 
its political significance. 
Conclusion 
The right to bargain campaign was no doubt dismissed by many as a futile, non-event. 
The research reported here however, questions such a conclusion. The campaign was 
definitely a major event on the New Zealand industrial scene, being one of the largest single 
issue industrial stoppages since the 1951 waterfront lockout. As an organisational exercise, 
the campaign has led to far greater involvement by rank and fJle trade unionists in con-
sidering the wider economic issues facing New Zealand and working people. In addition, 
the closer relationship between the FoL and the CSU has meant that the union movement 
in New Zealand has come much closer to speaking with 1 voice when dealing with Govern-
ment. This closer relationship between private and public sector unionists at peak council 
level has had a downstream ·effect with CSU representatives now attending FoL district 
Trades Council meetings, helping to decentralise the CSU. These organisational developments 
reflect a major shift in union leadership and direction since the retirement of Sir Tom 
Skinner. The educational impact of the campaign can be seen in the result of the General 
Election. One of the objectives of the campaign was the election of a Labour Government, 
which for the F oL was possibly the only way left to end the National Government's wage-
freeze. The impact of limited or sustained industrial action was designed to encourage 
employers to approach Goverment to change the rules and life the freeze. The Govern-
ment, however, continued to make it clear that it would not bow to such pressure and the 
only way open to lifting the wage-freeze became to change the Government. The election 
of a Labour Government led, within 5 months, to the restoration to unions of the right to 
bargain - albeit constrained bargaining. The challenge to the Labour Government in its 
term will be to respond to the trade union movement with economic policies that will 
8. The Dominion 27 December 1984, p. 8, Wellington. 
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capitalise on the support that has developed for alternative economic policies by the FoL/ 
CSU campaigns. If the Labour Government fails to win the support of the trade union 
movement for its economic policies, it will be interested to see whether Labour can remain 
in Government after the next election given the substantial organisational and educational 
support it received in the last. 
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